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Abstract
Much empirical evidence finds that governments react to fiscal imbalances in a non-linear way, through an
increasing marginal response of primary surpluses to changes in debt. This paper shows that non-linear
fiscal regimes alter equilibria under active and passive monetary-fiscal policies. The Fisher equation combined
with non-linear fiscal policies leads to multiple steady states. Under passive interest rate rules, even if the
steady state at which fiscal policy is active is locally saddle-path stable, there exist infinite equilibrium paths
originating in the neighborhood of that steady state which converge into a high-debt trap. Under active
interest rate rules, even if the steady state at which fiscal policy is active is locally unstable, there exists a
saddle connection with the high debt equilibrium along which inflation is uniquely determined.
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1 Introduction
A large body of empirical studies shows that fiscal authorities react to public debt accumulation in a
non-linear way.1 Governments tend to enhance the adoption of corrective actions as fiscal imbalances
worsen, through an increasing marginal response of primary surpluses to changes in debt. What are
the implications for monetary-fiscal policy interactions?
This paper shows that non-linear fiscal regimes give rise to steady-state multiplicity and alter dy-
namic equilibria under “active” and “passive” monetary-fiscal policies.2 The long-run Fisher equation
combined with a fiscal policy stance displaying convex non-linearity in the surplus-debt relationship
yields two types of steady states: a low-debt steady state at which fiscal policy is active and a high-
debt steady state at which fiscal policy is passive. It is demonstrated that the two steady states are
dynamically connected under either a passive or an active monetary policy stance. Under a passive
interest rate policy, even if the steady state at which fiscal policy is active is locally a unique stable
equilibrium (Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 2003), there exists an infinite number of equilibrium paths
originating in the neighborhood of that steady state which converge to a high-debt trap. Under an
active interest rate policy, even if the steady state at which fiscal policy is active is locally unstable
(Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 2003), there exists a saddle connection with the high-debt equilibrium
along which inflation is uniquely determined.
Consequently, a non-linear fiscal policy stance per se renders global dynamic properties of interest
rate rules fundamentally diﬀerent from local dynamic properties. This is, relatedly, critical for
questions of determinacy. In particular, if governments respond to debt accumulation non-linearly,
inflation turns out to be pinned down only by an active monetary policy stance, even near a steady
state at which fiscal policy is active. The passive monetary, active fiscal local regime does not ensure,
as instead in the context of standard theoretical formulations of monetary-fiscal interactions focused
on local analysis around a single steady state, equilibrium determinacy.
1See, for example, Bohn (1998), Sarno (2001), Arestis, Cipollini and Fattouh (2004), Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and
Esteve (2004, 2006), Arghyrou and Luintel (2007), Chortareas, Kapetanios and Uctum (2008), Considine and Gallagher
(2008), Cipollini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2009), Arghyrou and Fan (2011), and Legrenzi and Milas (2012a, 2012b).
2Fiscal policy is “passive” (“active”) in Leeper’s (1991) terminology or “locally Ricardian” (“locally non-Ricardian”)
in Woodford (2003)’s terminology if it implies (does not imply) local stability government liabilities for all paths of the
other endogenous variables in the neighborhood of a steady state. Monetary policy is “active” (“passive”) in Leeper’s
(1991) terminology or satisfies (does not satisfy) the “Taylor (1993) principle” in Woodford (2003)’s terminology if the
nominal interest rate set by the central bank increases by more (less) than one-for-one with respect to an increase in
the inflation rate. See Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011) for a recent review of literature on the interactions between
monetary and fiscal policy.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary model with non-linear fiscal
policy rules. Section 3 analyzes the issue of equilibrium dynamics and states the main results. Section
4 provides concluding comments.
2 The Model
In this section we shall use a countinuous-time macroeconomic environment à la Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2001) in order to show how a non-linear fiscal policy stance can easily lead to
multiplicity of steady-state equilibria.
2.1 Households
We consider an economy populated by a large number of identical infinitely lived households deriving
utility from consumption and real money holdings. The lifetime utility function of the representative
household is given by
∞Z
0
e−rtu(c (t) ,m (t))dt, (1)
where r > 0 denotes the rate of time preference, c (t) consumption, and m (t) real money balances
at instant of time t. The utility function u (· , ·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both
arguments. Consumption and real balances are Edgeworth complements, so that ucm > 0. The
representative household’s instant budget constraint is given by
a˙ (t) = (R (t)− π (t)) a (t)−R (t)m (t) + y (t)− c (t)− τ (t) , (2)
where a (t) denotes real financial wealth, consisting of interest-bearing government bonds and money
balances, y (t) an endowment of perishable goods, τ (t) lump-sum taxes net of public transfers, R (t)
the nominal interest rate on government bonds, and π (t) the inflation rate. Households are subject
to the borrowing limit condition precluding Ponzi’s games, given by
lim
t→∞
e−
R t
0 [R(j)−π(j)]dja (t) ≥ 0. (3)
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Optimality implies
uc(c (t) ,m (t)) = λ (t) , (4)
um(c (t) ,m (t)) = λ (t)R (t) , (5)
λ˙ (t) = λ (t) (r + π (t)−R (t)) , (6)
lim
t→∞
e−
R t
0 [R(j)−π(j)]dja (t) = 0, (7)
where λ (t) is the costate variable associated with the flow budget constraint.
2.2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority adopts an interest rate policy described by a feedback rule of the form
R (t) = r + π∗ + ψ(π (t)− π∗), (8)
where π∗ denotes the target inflation rate and ψ a positive parameter. Monetary policy is “active”
if ψ > 1 and is “passive” if ψ > 1.
The government’s instant budget constraint is given by
a˙ (t) = (R (t)− π (t)) a (t)− s (t) , (9)
where s (t) = τ (t) + R (t)m (t) denotes the primary surplus inclusive of interest savings from the
issuance of money.3 We depart from the related theoretical literature in the description of the fiscal
policy stance followed by the government. We assume that the fiscal authority adjusts the primary
surplus according to a non-linear feedback policy of the form
s (t) = σ(a (t)), (10)
where function σ (·) is continuous, positive, and satisfies σ0, σ00 > 0.
3Public consumption is set equal to zero, for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Multiple steady states under a non-linear fiscal regime.
2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that consumption is equal to the endowment, c (t) = y (t).
Assuming that the endowment is constant over time, y (t) = y for each t ∈ [0,∞), equations (4) and
(5) imply
λ (t) = L (R (t)) , (11)
with L0 = λ/ (umm/ucm −R) < 0. Combining (6), (8) and (11), equilibrium dynamics of inflation
are given by
π˙ (t) = − L (r + π
∗ + ψ(π (t)− π∗))
ψL0(r + π∗ + ψ(π (t)− π∗)) [(ψ − 1) (π (t)− π
∗)] . (12)
Substituting (10) and (8) into (9), the law of motion of government liabilities can be expressed
as
a˙ (t) = [r + (ψ − 1) (π (t)− π∗)] a (t)− σ(a (t)). (13)
2.4 Steady States and Active-Passive Fiscal Policies
Setting π˙ (t) , a˙ (t) = 0 in (12) and (13) yields π = π∗ and σ(a) = ra. Because the fiscal policy
reaction function σ (·) is positive and obeys σ0, σ00 > 0, the steady-state relation σ(a) = ra has, in
general, two solutions, a∗1, a
∗
2 > 0. Setting a
∗
1 < a
∗
2, it follows σ
0 (a∗1) < r and σ0 (a∗2) > r (see Figure
1). Hence, using Leeper (1991)’s terminology, fiscal policy is “active” in the neighborhood of the
steady state (π∗, a∗1), because from (13) ∂a˙ (t) /∂a (t)|(π∗,a∗1) = r−σ
0 (a∗1) > 0, and is “passive” in the
neighborhood of the steady state (π∗, a∗2), because from (13) ∂a˙ (t) /∂a (t)|(π∗,a∗2) = r − σ
0 (a∗2) < 0.
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We now examine local and global equilibrium dynamics under both passive and active monetary
policies. Consider first the dynamic eﬀects of a passive interest rate rule (ψ < 1). The following
proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Suppose that fiscal policy is non-linear (σ0, σ00 > 0) and monetary policy is passive
(ψ < 1). Then: (a) locally, the steady state (π∗, a∗1) is a saddle point and the steady state (π
∗, a∗2) is
a sink; (b) globally, there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood of (π∗, a∗1)
and converging asymptotically to (π∗, a∗2); the saddle manifold associated to (π
∗, a∗1) is the boundary
of the basin of attraction of (π∗, a∗2).
Proof. (a) Let J(π∗,a∗1) be the Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium system (12)-(13) evaluated at the
steady state (π∗, a∗1). We have detJ(π∗,a∗1) =
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)[r−σ0(a∗1)]
ψL0(r+π∗) < 0, because L
0(r + π∗) < 0,
ψ < 1, and σ0 (a∗1) < r. Therefore, the steady state (π∗, a∗1) is a saddle point, with the stable
arm given by π (t) = π∗ +
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)/ψL0(r+π∗)−[r−σ0(a∗1)]
(ψ−1)a∗1
(a (t)− a∗1). Let J(π∗,a∗2) be the Jaco-
bian matrix of the system (12)-(13) evaluated at the steady state (π∗, a∗2). We have trJ(π∗,a∗2) =
L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)
ψL0(r+π∗) +[r − σ0 (a∗2)] < 0 and detJ(π∗,a∗2) =
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)[r−σ0(a∗2)]
ψL0(r+π∗) > 0, because L
0(r+π∗) < 0,
ψ < 1, and σ0 (a∗2) > r. Therefore, the steady state (π∗, a∗2) is a sink. (b) From (12) and (13),
the two isoclines π˙ (t) = 0 and a˙ (t) = 0 are π (t) = π∗ and π (t) = π∗ + [σ(a(t))/a(t)]−r(ψ−1) , respec-
tively. We have dπ(t)da(t)
¯¯¯
a˙(t)=0
= σ
0(a(t))−[σ(a(t))/a(t)]
(ψ−1)a(t) , which is positive at the steady state (π
∗, a∗1),
where σ0 (a∗1) < [σ (a∗1) /a∗1] = r, equal to zero for σ0 (a (t)) = σ (a (t)) /a (t), and negative at the
steady state (π∗, a∗2), where σ
0 (a∗2) > [σ (a∗2) /a∗2] = r. Thus, in the phase plane (π (t) , a (t)),
the isocline π˙ (t) = 0 is horizontal, the isocline a˙ (t) = 0 is inverted U-shaped, and the two iso-
clines intersect at (π∗, a∗1) and (π
∗, a∗2). From (12) and (13), π˙ (t) > (<) 0 if π (t) < (>)π
∗ and
a˙ (t) > (<) 0 if π (t) < (>)π∗ + [σ(a(t))/a(t)]−r(ψ−1) . Figure 2 shows the global dynamics of the system.
The stable arm of the saddle point passing through (π∗, a∗1), SS, has a positive slope, given by
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)/ψL0(r+π∗)−[r−σ0(a∗1)]
(ψ−1)a∗1
, which is greater than the slope of the isocline a˙ (t) = 0 evaluated
at (π∗, a∗1), given by
σ0(a∗1)−r
(ψ−1)a∗1
. Hence, in the neighborhood of the steady state (π∗, a∗1), for a given
initial condition a (0), there exists an infinite number of equilibrium initial values π (0) < π (0)S =
π∗ +
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)/ψL0(r+π∗)−[r−σ0(a∗1)]
(ψ−1)a∗1
(a (0)− a∗1), for example π (0)1 and π (0)2 in Figure 2, such
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Figure 2: Dynamic behavior of (π (t) , a (t)) with a non-linear fiscal regime and a passive interest rate
rule.
that (π (t) , a (t)) will converge asymptotically to the steady state (π∗, a∗2). The saddle manifold
associated to (π∗, a∗1) is thus the boundary of the basin of attraction of (π
∗, a∗2). ¥
Leeper (1991) and Woodford (2003) demonstrate an active fiscal, passive monetary regime yields
local determinacy. In Figure 2, this result corresponds to the existence of a saddle path asso-
ciated to the steady state (π∗, a∗1). If one restricts attention to local dynamics around (π
∗, a∗1),
for a given initial condition a (0) 6= a∗1, there in fact exists a unique value of inflation, π (0)S =
π∗+
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)/ψL0(r+π∗)−[r−σ0(a∗1)]
(ψ−1)a∗1
(a (0)− a∗1), such that (π (t) , a (t)) will converge to the steady
state (π∗, a∗1). Nevertheless, (π
∗, a∗1) is not the only steady-state equilibrium if the conduct of fiscal
policy is non-linear. Proposition 1 shows that, when the fiscal regime is non-linear, even if the steady
state (π∗, a∗1) at which fiscal policy is active is locally a unique stable equilibrium, there exists an
infinite number of equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood of (π∗, a∗1) which converge to
the high-debt steady state (π∗, a∗2). Inflation no longer needs to “jump” on to saddle path ensure
global stability. All initial values π (0) below the saddle path are equilibrium values which make
(π (t) , a (t)) converge to the steady state (π∗, a∗2).
4 This implies that the dynamic system is globally
indeterminate.
Consider now the dynamic eﬀects of an active interest rate rule (ψ > 1). The following proposition
holds.
4Notice that the inflation rate follows a non-monotonous trajectory if π (0) lies in the region between the saddle
path and the isocline a˙ (t) = 0.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that fiscal policy is non-linear (σ0, σ00 > 0) and monetary policy is active
(ψ > 1). Then: (a) locally, the steady state (π∗, a∗1) is a source and the steady state (π
∗, a∗2) is a
saddle point; (b) globally, there exists a saddle connection joining the two steady states (π∗, a∗1) and
(π∗, a∗2), along which the inflation rate is uniquely determined (π = π
∗).
Proof. (a) Let J(π∗,a∗1) be the Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium system (12)-(13) evaluated at
the steady state (π∗, a∗1). We have trJ(π∗,a∗1) =
L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)
ψL0(r+π∗) + [r − σ
0 (a∗1)] > 0 and detJ(π∗,a∗1) =
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)[r−σ0(a∗1)]
ψL0(r+π∗) > 0, because L
0(r + π∗) < 0, ψ > 1, and σ0 (a∗1) < r. Therefore, the steady
state (π∗, a∗1) is a source. Let J(π∗,a∗2) be the Jacobian matrix of the system (12)-(13) evaluated at
the steady state (π∗, a∗2). We have detJ(π∗,a∗2) =
−L(r+π∗)(ψ−1)[r−σ0(a∗2)]
ψL0(r+π∗) < 0, because L
0(r+ π∗) < 0,
ψ > 1, and σ0 (a∗2) > r. Therefore, the steady state (π∗, a∗2) is a saddle point, with the stable
arm given by π (t) = π∗. (b) From (12) and (13), the two isoclines π˙ (t) = 0 and a˙ (t) = 0 are
π (t) = π∗ and π (t) = π∗ + [σ(a(t))/a(t)]−r(ψ−1) , respectively. We have
dπ(t)
da(t)
¯¯¯
a˙(t)=0
= σ
0(a(t))−[σ(a(t))/a(t)]
(ψ−1)a(t) ,
which is negative at the steady state (π∗, a∗1), where σ
0 (a∗1) < [σ (a∗1) /a∗1] = r, equal to zero for
σ0 (a (t)) = [σ (a (t)) /a (t)], and positive at the steady state (π∗, a∗2), where σ0 (a∗2) > [σ (a∗2) /a∗2] = r.
Thus, in the phase plane (π (t) , a (t)), the isocline π˙ (t) = 0 is horizontal, the isocline a˙ (t) = 0 is
U-shaped, and the two isoclines intersect at (π∗, a∗1) and (π
∗, a∗2). From (12) and (13), π˙ (t) > (<) 0
if π (t) > (<)π∗ and a˙ (t) > (<) 0 if π (t) > (<)π∗+ σ(a(t))−ra(t)(ψ−1)a(t) . Figure 3 shows the global dynamics
of the system. There exists a unique trajectory originating in the neighborhood of the steady state
(π∗, a∗1) and converging to the other steady state (π
∗, a∗2). The saddle connection joining the two
steady states is given by the isocline π˙ (t) = 0 (π = π∗), which is also the stable arm of the saddle-
path stable steady state (π∗, a∗2), SS. ¥
If monetary policy is active, the steady state (π∗, a∗1) at which fiscal policy is active now deliv-
ers local instability, consistently with the results obtained in Leeper (1991) and Woodford (2003).
Therefore, restricting attention to local dynamics around (π∗, a∗1), no stable equilibria exist. However,
Proposition 2 shows that, in the case in which the fiscal policy stance is non-linear, even if the steady
state (π∗, a∗1) is locally unstable, there exists a saddle connection with the high-debt steady state
(π∗, a∗2). As it emerges from Figure 3, the saddle connection corresponds to the isocline π˙ (t) = 0,
π = π∗. Thus, under a non linear fiscal regime, the dynamic system is globally determinate and
inflation is pinned down to the target rate even around the steady state at which fiscal policy is
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Figure 3: Dynamic behavior of (π (t) , a (t)) with a non-linear fiscal regime and an active interest rate
rule.
active.
4 Concluding Remarks
Much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of an increasing marginal reaction of primary
budget surpluses to public debt. The contribution of the present paper is to show that this type of
non-linearity in the conduct of fiscal policy is an independent source of multiplicity of steady-state
equilibria and critically influences the dynamic interactions between monetary and fiscal policy.
The basic reason is that the Fisher equation in conjunction with a non-linear fiscal regime charac-
terized by an increasing marginal response of primary surpluses to government liabilities necessarily
leads to two steady-state solutions. In the neighborhood of the low-debt steady state, fiscal policy
is active, since the marginal adjustment of the primary surplus is lower than the steady-state real
interest rate. In the neighborhood of the high-debt steady state, fiscal policy is passive, since the
marginal adjustment of the primary surplus is higher than the steady-state real interest rate.
The central point is that the two steady states are dynamically connected under either passive
or active interest rate policies. Under a passive monetary policy stance, the steady state at which
fiscal policy is active displays local equilibrium determinacy, but there exists an infinite number of
self-fulfilling trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state and spiraling up into a
high-debt trap. Under an active monetary policy stance, the steady state at which fiscal policy is
9
active displays local instability, but there exists a saddle connection with the high-debt equilibrium
along which inflation is uniquely pinned down.
Thus, the analytical results derived in this paper suggest that considering potential non-linearities
in governments’ budgetary policies may be essential for a global characterization of monetary-fiscal
policy interactions. Extensions of the present framework aimed to incorporate, for example, the zero-
lower bound problem on nominal interest rates, nominal rigidities, distortionary taxation, sovereign
risk, and/or agents’ learning, may constitute the object of further research.
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